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ABSTRACT

For a variety of reasons, vaccines and other critical pharmaceutical
productshave become increasinglyscarce in the lastfew years, andpersistent
shortages involving dozens of essentialdrugs may imperil the public health.
Pressuresemanatingfrom regulatoryagencies, the courts, and insurershave
conspired to make some lines of the pharmaceutical business less than
attractive.Although concerns about unpredictabletort liability received most
of the blame in the past, two otherfactors may help to accountfor the latest
round of drug shortages:stringentfederal control of manufacturingfacilities
and aggressive cost-containment efforts that further erode profit margins.
Whatever the cause, scarce supplies necessitate efforts at rationingthatpose
their own difficulties for health care providers. Policymakers could avoid
puttingphysicians to such tough choices in treatingpatients by focusing on
ways to ensure the production of adequate quantities of these highly costeffective medical technologies. Some commentators have calledfor greater
public sector involvement, but this Article concludes that, in addition to
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bolstering its emergency stockpiles, the federalgovernment instead needs to
take steps designed to encourageprivate manufacturersto continuesupplying
criticalpharmaceuticals. To this end, the government should adopt more
flexible regulationsgoverningmanufacturingfacilities,providecompanies with
greater protection from the vagaries of tort liability, and avoid pursuing
excessive cost-control strategies. Otherwise, patients may continue to lose
access to important therapeuticproducts.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the still mysterious mailing
of weaponized anthrax spores one month later, awakened this country to the
risks of bioterrorism and brought attention to what has become a growing
problem: shortages of antibiotics, vaccines, and other medical technologies.'
Although this situation poses concerns about our readiness in the event of a
bioterrorist attack, it has more mundane and potentially serious public health
implications. In addition, while it should come as no great surprise that we have
inadequate supplies of treatments for smallpox and anthrax, persistent shortages
of common childhood vaccines and other critical pharmaceuticals seem
inexplicable.
A recent front page story in the Washington Post highlighted the problem:
"Shots designed to protect children against eight of [eleven] vaccine-preventable infections have been intermittently in short supply everywhere in the
United States since last summer. Some will remain hard to get for at least
another six months."2 The affected products include a couple of long-used
combination vaccines-one to protect against diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis
(DTP), and another one to protect against measles, mumps, and rubella
(MMR)-along with two newer vaccines-one to protect against pneumonia, and
another one to protect against varicella (chickenpox).3 Although the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have taken interim steps to respond to
these temporary supply problems, "physicians are viewing the shortages as an

I. See Rick Weiss, Bioterrorism:An Even More Devastating Threat, WASH. POST, Sept.
17, 2001, at A24; see also Raymond J. Baxter et al., Is the US. Public Health System Readyfor
Bioterrorism? An Assessment of the US. Public Health Infrastructure and its Capacityfor
Infectious Disease Surveillance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 1, 18 (2001) ("While
bolstering the nation's supply of vaccines and pharmaceuticals is important, it is even more
critical to shore up the public health infrastructure .... ).
2. David Brown, Severe Vaccine Shortages Termed "'Unprecedented," WASH. POST, Apr.
20, 2002, at Al.
3. See id. The DTP vaccine sometimes is designated as "DTaP" to reflect a recent shift to
an acellular version of the pertussis component, while the combined tetanus and diphtheria
toxoids are designated as "Td" when supplied without the pertussis vaccine component (for
instance as a booster shot administered to adults). The shortages eased a few months later. See
Liz F. Kay, Vaccine Shortage Over, CDC Says, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 2002, at A22. But see
Robert Pear, States Ration Low Supplies of5 Vaccinesfor Children, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002,
at A20.
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extremely ominous development. Many find it appalling that this could happen
in a country that spends more on health care per capita than any other on
Earth."4 Dozens of other essential pharmaceutical products also have run low
in the last couple of years, including the anticoagulant heparin, the antiviral
drug ganciclovir, several antiemetics, diuretics, antiepileptic agents, injectable
corticosteroids, and neuromuscular blocking agents.'
This sort of thing has happened before. In the mid-1980s, manufacturers
of pediatric vaccines dramatically increased the prices of their products or left

the market altogether. As the California Supreme Court recounted fifteen years
ago:
There are only two manufacturers of the [DTP] vaccine remaining in
the market, and the cost of each dose rose a hundredfold from 11 cents
in 1982 to $11.40 in 1986, $8 of which was for an insurance reserve.
The price increase roughly paralleled an increase in the number of
lawsuits from one in 1978 to 219 in 1985.6
Although concerns about unpredictable tort liability provided the primary
impetus behind these developments, other factors contributed to the fear of
shortages at the time. In 1986, responding to these developments, Congress
4. Brown, supra note 2, at Al ("'This is unprecedented,' said Walter A. Orenstein, a
physician who directs the [CDC's] National Immunization Program .

. .

. 'I have never seen

anything like the supply problems with this many vaccines in the 24 years I've worked in
immunization."'); see also Robert Pear, Shortage of Juvenile Vaccines Worries Doctors and
Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, at A38.
5. See Am. Soc'y of Health-Sys. Pharmacists, Drug Product Shortages Management

Resource Center, at http://www.ashp.org/shortage (last visited May 23, 2002); Donna Young,
Drug Shortages FrustrateHealth CareProviders,59 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 698, 698
(2002) ("Three months into 2002, FDA had identified 8 'medically necessary' drug products, not
including vaccines, as being in short supply and 11 other products . . . as having limited
distribution."); Victoria Stagg Elliott, ChangesSought to CombatDrug, Vaccine Shortages, AM.
MED. NEWS, Dec. 24/31, 2001, at 1 (describing shortages of several critical pharmaceuticals);
Sabin Russell, Critical Vaccines, Medicine Run Low, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 10, 2002, at AI ("There
is a growing uneasiness about the volume and frequency of drug supply shortfalls."). In the mid1990s, supplies of fertility drugs ran short. See Tamar Nordenberg, DrugSupply Restored, FDA
CONSUMER, Jan.-Feb. 1997, http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/l997/197_fert.html#supply (last
visited Nov. 15, 2002).
6. Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal. 1988) ("One producer of [the DTP]
vaccine withdrew from the market, giving as its reason extreme liability exposure, cost of
litigation and the difficulty of continuing to obtain adequate insurance." (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)); see also Gina Kolata, Litigation Causes Huge PriceIncreases in
Childhood Vaccines, 232 SCIENCE 1339 (1986); Majorie Sun, The Vexing Problems of Vaccine
Compensation, 227 SCIENCE 1012, 1012 (1985) (reporting spot shortages); Philip M. Boffey,
Vaccine Liability Threatens Supplies, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1984, at Cl; Stephen Engelberg,
Maker of Vaccine Quits the Market, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1984, at A2 1.
See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 99th Cong., CHILDHOOD
7.
IMMUNIZATIONS 68-70, 85-87 (Comm. Print 1986) (focusing on liability concerns, but also
noting that one manufacturer had experienced production problems); INST. OF MED., VACCINE
SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 11, 85, 119 (1985); Georges Peter, Editorial, Vaccine Crisis: An
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passed the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.' The statute helped to
stabilize the pediatric vaccine market, but supply problems persist, and experts
in the field continue to debate different mechanisms for reducing the threat of
future shortages. 9

Fortunately, past supply interruptions have involved vaccines produced by
more than a single company,'0 but "several vaccines now have only one
licensed producer."" With the shrinking number of companies manufacturing
pediatric vaccines, supplies have become more vulnerable:
Given the increased concentration of vaccine producers licensed by
the United States, the complexity of the manufacturing processes, and
the time-consuming procedures for licensing new production facilities,
a serious incident, such as a fire, at a single production facility could
disrupt U.S. supplies of some vaccines for months if not years. Any
such disruption could rapidly affect public health ....
"
In the fall of 2001, something like that happened-the only manufacturer of the
MMR and varicella vaccines shut down its sole production facility for a couple
of months for scheduled maintenance and upgrades, resulting in spot shortages
of these two products.' 3 Earlier that year, one of the last remaining domestic

Emerging Societal Problem, 151 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 981 (1985).
8. Pub. L. No.99-660, 100 Stat. 3743, 3755-84 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2000)); see also infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
9. See David C. Mowery & Violaine Mitchell, Improvingthe Reliability ofthe US. Vaccine
Supply: An Evaluation ofAlternatives, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 973 (1995).
10. See id. at 997 ("Interruptions in the supply of U.S. vaccines have been fairly common
during the past decade ....The effect of these interruptions on U.S. vaccine availability has
been limited, however, partly because the most frequent supply interruptions have occurred in
a product [DTP] for which there are five licensed U.S. producers."); see also id. at 984
("Although several (two public and two private sector) domestic sources supply the combined
[DTP] vaccine, several recent interruptions occurred in the DTP vaccine supply.").
11. Id. at 980; see also id. at 984 ("Both the oral polio vaccine (OPV) and the combination
[MMR] vaccine have only one U.S.-licensed supplier .. ");id. at 997 ("[T]he trends toward
increased producer concentration increase the likelihood that the number of single-source
vaccines on the recommended childhood immunization schedule will increase."); Brown, supra
note 2, at AI ("[O]nly a handful of U.S. companies still make vaccines. A generation ago, there
were about 20 producers .. . .There's been nothing short of a stampede away from the
business.").
12. Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 975; see also id. at 988 ("Although U.S. singlesource vaccine suppliers have avoided production interruptions, there is little reason to discount
this possibility in the future. Policies to encourage the development of additional sources of
supply therefore merit consideration."); id. at 997 ("If interruptions in the production of OPV or
MMR, which are produced by a single U.S. supplier, were comparably frequent [to past DTP
supply interruptions], the public health risks would be substantially greater."); Jonathan Bor,
Shortages Hamper Children's Vaccination, BALT. SUN, Mar. 23, 2002, at IA ("[P]roduction
problems at any one factory can cripple the nation's supply.").
13. See Brown, supra note 2, at A I (describing repairs and upgrades undertaken at Merck's
vaccine plant).
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suppliers of the DTP vaccine announced that it would cease production rather
than invest in upgrades to its production facility, 4 leaving only a pair of
manufacturers headquartered overseas to supply the market and scrambling to
meet the additional demand. 5

Usually, short supplies of drugs do not increase the risks to patient health
because effective therapeutic substitutes remain available, but occasionally
these shortfalls do endanger patients. 6 Vaccine shortages can interfere with
mass immunization efforts,

7

and, with time, they would threaten to unravel

some of the remarkable gains made against infectious diseases during the last
half century.' 8 Even when substitute vaccines exist, they may represent older
formulations that offer somewhat reduced safety, efficacy, and/or
convenience.' 9 Similarly, patients who have come to depend on a particular
medication to treat a chronic health condition may suffer if unable to secure

14. See id. ("A competitor is working on a vaccine that would combine DTaP with polio
and hepatitis B vaccines, potentially making Wyeth's product obsolete. Spending money on a
plant to keep making the old vaccine was simply viewed as not worth it.").
15. See id. ("The current troubles began with the announcement by the pharmaceutical
company Wyeth Lederle in January 2001 that it would stop making vaccines containing tetanus
and diphtheria components.... Only one company, Aventis Pasteur, [now] makes Td, and only
two, Aventis and Glaxo SmithKline, make DTaP. Although each is boosting production, they've
been unable to meet demand."). The same thing just happened with vaccines for influenza
pneumonia. See Scott Hensley, Wyeth Stops Making Flu Vaccine; Goal Now Is to Develop
Inhalant,WALL ST.J., Nov. 20, 2002, at D2.
16. See Melody Petersen, Drug Shortages Become a Worry at Hospitals Around the
Country, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2001, at Al.
17. See Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 985 ("A 'brief' supply interruption, that is
one lasting fewer than six months, need not immediately increase the burden of
vaccine-preventable diseases, although this is a concern in urban areas .... Nevertheless,
catching up with the cohorts that missed key immunizations would be difficult and costly."); see
also CDC, GeneralRecommendations on Immunization, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. No. RR-2 (2002); CDC, National, State, and Urban Area Vaccination Coverage Levels
Among ChildrenAged 19-35 Months-UnitedStates, 2000,50 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 637 (2001).
18. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 7 (1986) ("[T]he withdrawal of even a single vaccine
manufacturer would represent the very real possibility of vaccine shortages, and, in turn,
increasing numbers of unimmunized children, and, perhaps, a resurgence of preventable
diseases."), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6348; Heikki Peltola, What Would Happen
If We Stopped Vaccination?, 356 LANCET S22 (2000) (estimating that the United States would
experience more than 1,000 deaths annually if vaccinations against measles and Hib ceased); see
also E.J. Gangarosa et al., Impact ofAnti- Vaccine Movements on PertussisControl: The Untold
Story, 351 LANCET 356, 360 (1998); Julie Appleby & Anita Manning, Stockpiles Tapped as
Supplies of Vaccines Run Short, USA TODAY, Feb. 18, 2002, at lB (referring to "an outbreak in
1989-91 that led to 55,000 measles cases, 11,000 hospitalizations and 123 deaths"); Jane E.
Brody, For the Vaccine-Wary, a Lesson in History,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2000, at F8 (describing
pertussis epidemics in England and Japan, which resulted in dozens of deaths, after
immunization rates plummeted in the mid- 1970s).
19. See Mowery & Mitchell, supranote 9, at 984 ("[A]n interruption in the U.S. supply of
either MMR or OPV could force changes in the immunization schedule, perhaps including a shift
to the inactivated polio vaccine or, with MMR, a return to use of single antigens.").
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supplies.20 In addition, alternative suppliers may introduce separate safety
concerns. For instance, when the manufacturer of betamethasone experienced
quality control problems and had to halt production temporarily, physicians and
hospitals in one region of the country turned to a local pharmacy with requests
to compound this injectable corticosteroid from available bulk materials, but
the product became contaminated and resulted in two deaths and dozens of
injuries among patients."
What accounts for this state of affairs, and how, if at all, should the
government respond? Part II of this Article considers some of the causes of
recent shortages-including stringent federal regulation of manufacturing
facilities and cost-containment efforts that create a downward pressure on
prices-as well as some of the consequences for the public health. Whatever the
explanation for scarce supplies, they place patient welfare at risk and present
difficult rationing choices for health care providers. Part III of this Article turns
to some of the possible remedies-including enhanced protection from tort
liability, improved government stockpiles, and compulsory licensing or public
sector manufacturing-before concluding that policymakers need to focus on
reducing rather than further increasing the economic disincentives against
supplying needed vaccines and other drugs.
II.

DIAGNOSING THE PROBLEM

For a variety of reasons, shortages of pharmaceuticals have become
increasingly common.22 In some cases, a shortage results because of problems
with the supply of raw materials or in the manufacture of the finished drug
product. For example, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) shut down the
BioPort Corporation, the sole manufacturer of an experimental anthrax vaccine,
for several years because of quality control problems. Recently, a nationwide

20. See Shari Roan, Longtime Drug's New Troubles: Synthroid, Taken by 8 Million People
with Thyroid Problems,Is Under FDA Scrutiny, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 200 1, at S 1; see also Chris
Adams, FDA Weighs Requests to Return Lotronex to Consumer Market, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19,
2001, at B10; Denise Grady, FDA Pulls a Drug, and Patients Despair,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
200 1, at F l (describing the withdrawal of the irritable bowel syndrome drug Lotronex); Marc
Kaufman, Panel Suggests Irritable-BowelDrug Be Sold Again, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2002, at
A7.
21. See Fred Gebhart, FatalMeningitis Linked to Compoundingby Calif.Pharmacy,DRUG
TOPICs, July 2, 2001, at 32.

22. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. GAO-02-987, CHILDHOOD VACCINES:
ENSURING AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY POSES CONTINUING CHALLENGES 14-19 (2002) [hereinafter
GAO]; Brown, supra note 2, at Al ("There's no single cause behind the shortages. Instead,
they've arisen from a combination of business decisions, bad luck and greater than expected
demand for the vaccines."); Charles Omstein & Charles Piller, US. Plagued by Chronic

Shortage of Key Vaccines, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at Al.
23. See Keith Bradsher, The Only US. Laboratoryfor the Anthrax Vaccine Says
Production WillBe Delayed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,2001, at B7; Guy Gugliotta, No Decision on
Anthrax Vaccine Program:Pentagon Weighs Military, Civilian Needs Against Limited Supply,
WASH. POST, May 20, 2002, at A2; see also Thomas V. Inglesby et al., Anthrax as a Biological
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recall triggered by evidence of product contamination created a serious
shortage of anti-venin used to treat snakebite victims.24 The FDA should, of
course, protect patients from risks associated with defective therapeutic
products, but, if the regulatory infractions do not pose an immediate health
threat, then it also must remember the consequences that may flow from
decisions to interrupt manufacturing by sole suppliers of critical pharmaceuticals.
Apart from manufacturing problems, drug shortages may arise from
deliberate decisions by pharmaceutical companies to cease or drastically reduce
production of a product because profits have declined. Compounds that have
lost their patent protection typically command far lower prices, and manufacturers often will prefer to focus on a newer product designed to replace its
predecessor and generate more substantial revenues. In 1997, in an effort to
minimize the short-term supply disruptions caused by corporate decisions to
cease marketing critical pharmaceuticals, Congress mandated that sole
suppliers of such products notify the FDA at least six months ahead of time so
that the agency can alert physician and patient organizations.25 In implementing
this provision, the FDA has devoted a section of its official website to the
subject, tracking problems with the supplies of particular drugs and offering
recommendations to the health care community.26
This Part elaborates on some of the causes of inadequate supplies of critical
pharmaceutical products as well as the consequences of such shortages.
Although tort liability received most of the blame in the past, two other factors
may help to account for the latest round of shortages: stringent federal control
of manufacturing facilities and cost-containment efforts that erode profit
margins. Whatever the cause, scarce supplies necessitate efforts at rationing
that pose their own difficulties for health care providers and their patients.
Instead of making tough microallocational judgments involving these highly

Weapon, 2002: Updated Recommendationsfor Management, 287 JAMA 2236, 2244 (2002).
24. See Charles Rabin, Low Supplies of Antivenin Heighten Snakebite Danger,MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 28, 2002, at 3B. A few years earlier, concerns about viral contamination of raw
materials coupled with unanticipated demand created shortages ofintravenous immunoglobulin.
See CDC, Availability of Immune Globulin Intravenousfor Treatment of Immune Deficient
Patients-UnitedStates, 1997-1998,48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 159 (1999).
25. See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115,
§ 131, 111 Stat. 2332 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 356c (2000)); 65 Fed. Reg. 66,665 (2000)
(proposed Nov. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.81(b)(3)(iii), 314.91); see also id.
at 66,669 (estimating that this would happen only once a year on average).
26.
See Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, FDA, Drug Shortages, at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/shortages (last visited May 22, 2002). The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention also may disseminate such information. See, e.g., CDC, Decreased
Availability ofPneumococcalConjugate Vaccine, 50 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 783
(2001); CDC, Shortage ofSpectinomycin-UnitedStates, 50 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 470 (2001); see also CDC, PotentialShortage ofSupplemental Test Kitsfor DetectingHIVI Antibodies, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 395 (2002).
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cost-effective medical technologies, we need to find ways of avoiding such
artificial shortages in the first place.
A.

Backdoor "DrugLag"

In 1962, Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to
strengthen the premarket approval requirements applicable to new drugs,
forcing sponsors to provide proof of effectiveness as well as safety.27 Over the
years, critics have blamed the FDA's lengthy and demanding approval process
for creating a "drug lag" that delayed pharmaceutical products already
28
approved in Europe and elsewhere from reaching the United States market.
Commentators have paid far less attention to the other changes wrought by the
1962 amendments, such as the requirement that sponsors comply with good

manufacturing practices (GMPs).29 Just as rigorous premarket review has both
positive and negative effects, the careful control of manufacturing processes is
not an unalloyed good.
In recent years, the agency has improved the speed with which it approves
new drugs."a In the process, however, it has diverted attention from other
regulatory tasks. For instance, as it focuses increasingly on reviewing
applications for product approval, the FDA may invest fewer resources in its

27. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000)); see also LARS NOAH & BARBARA A. NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: CASES AND MATERIALS 198-219 (2002) (discussing the FDA's new drug
approval requirements).
28. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. HRD-80-64, FDA DRUG APPROVAL-A
LENGTHY PROCESS THAT DELAYS THE AVAILABILITY OF IMPORTANT NEW DRUGS (1980); HENRY
G. GRABOWSKI & JOHN M. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: BALANCING THE
BENEFITS AND RISKS (1983); Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of
Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 276-77 (1991); Richard A. Merrill,
The Architecture ofGovernment Regulation ofMedicalProducts,82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1753-55,
1788-89(1996); Barry S. Roberts & David Z. Bodenheimer, The DrugAmendments of1962: The
Anatomy of a Regulatory Failure, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 581.
29. See 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B) (2000); 21 C.F.R. pts. 210-211 (2002); Nat'l Ass'n of
Pharm. Mfrs. v. FDA, 637 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1981) (upholding the agency's authority to adopt
binding GMP rules); United States v. Undetermined Quantities ...Proplast, 800 F. Supp. 499,
502 (S.D. Tex. 1992); Nat'l Ass'n of Pharm. Mfrs. v. HHS, 586 F. Supp. 740, 748-63 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (rejecting numerous substantive and procedural challenges to the FDA's GMP
regulations).
30. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. PEMD-96-1, FDA DRUG APPROVAL: REVIEW
TIME HAS DECREASED INRECENT YEARS (1995); David A. Kessler et al., Approval ofNew Drugs
in the United States: Comparison with the United Kingdom. Germany, andJapan, 276 JAMA
1826, 1829-31 (1996); Deborah G. Parver, Comment, Expediting the DrugApproval Process:
An Analysis of the FDA ModernizationAct of 1997, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1249, 1266 (1999); Chris
Adams & Scott Hensley, DrugMakers Want FDA to Move Quicker, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2002,
at B12.
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periodic inspection activities.31 This may result in greater-though perhaps
largely undetected-industry noncompliance with GMP requirements.32 When
problems eventually come to light, the agency may put a temporary halt to
further sales of a manufacturer's drugs.33 In addition, insufficient resources
available for conducting inspections may result in delays when sponsors apply
for supplemental new drug approval in order to manufacture a previously
approved product in a new facility.34
Manufacturers of vaccines must satisfy not only new drug approval
requirements but also a separate set of controls that govern biologics,35 though
recent amendments to the regulations have reduced some of these burdensome
requirements.36 Vaccines require more complex manufacturing facilities and

31. See Margaret Gilhooley, The AdministrativeConference and the ProgressofFood and
Drug Reform, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 129, 141 (1998); Bruce N. Kuhlik, Industry Funding of
Improvements in the FDA 's New Drug Approval Process: The PrescriptionDrug User Fee Act
of 1992, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 483, 500 & n.96 (1992) (explaining that user fees cannot be
utilized by the FDA to finance compliance monitoring activities); Barbara A. Noah, Adverse
DrugReactions:HarnessingExperientialDatato PromotePatientWelfare, 49 CATH. U. L. REv.
449, 462-66, 494-95 (2000). The FDA has decided to accept (on a reciprocal basis) inspections
of overseas drug manufacturing facilities conducted by its regulatory counterparts among
members of the European Union. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 26(A) (2002); see also id. § 26.4(b)
(excluding biologics); GAO, supra note 22, at 23 (suggesting flexibility in case of vaccine
shortages).
32. See GAO, supra note 22, at 15-16; Mary K. Olson, Agency Rulemaking, Political
Influences, Regulation, andIndustry Compliance, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 573, 593 (1999); Mary
Olson, Substitution in Regulatory Agencies: FDA Enforcement Alternatives, 12 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 376, 378-79, 383-84, 387 (1996).
33. See John D. Copanos & Sons, Inc. v. FDA, 854 F.2d 510, 514-18, 522-26 (D.C. Cir.
1988); United States v. Barr Labs., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 458, 464, 487-91 (D.N.J. 1993).
34. See infra note 42; see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(2)(vi) (2002). When the agency cites
a company for GMP violations, it may prompt compliance by delaying final approval of pending
applications for any new drugs slated for manufacturing at the allegedly substandard facilities.
See David Barr, The ChangingApproval Process:Preapprovallnspection,47 FOOD&DRUG L.J.
359, 361 (1992); Merrill, supra note 28, at 1787; Melody Petersen, FaultsFound at a Schering
Plant,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001, at C3.
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2000); Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Research, FDA,
Vaccine Product Approval Process, at http://www.fda.gov/cber/vaccines/vacappr.htm (last
visited May 28, 2002); William David Hardin, Poliomyelitis Vaccine-History, Regulations and
Recommendations, 40 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 145, 151-55 (1985); Mowery & Mitchell, supra
note 9, at 986 ("FDA regulation of vaccines is considerably more stringent than regulation of
other pharmaceuticals, because it places greater demands on licensing production facilities and
monitoring individual batches of vaccines."). The agency had issued monographs setting out
standards for vaccines, see 21 C.F.R. pts. 620, 630 (1995), but it subsequently decided to repeal
these as obsolete, see 61 Fed. Reg. 40,153 (Aug. 1, 1996). It continues to review vaccines
licensed by the NIH before the transfer of this responsibility to the FDA in 1972. See 65 Fed.
Reg. 31,003 (May 15, 2000).
36. See 64 Fed. Reg. 56,441, 56,441-42, 56,450-52 (Oct. 20, 1999) (codified in scattered
sections of 21 C.F.R. pt. 601) (amending the regulations to replace separate applications for
product and establishment licensing with a single biologics license application (BLA)); 61 Fed.
Reg. 24,227, 24,232-33 (May 14, 1996) (amending the regulations to exempt certain wellcharacterized biotechnology products from separate establishment licensing application
requirement). In 1997, Congress directed the FDA to minimize the differences in product
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longer production lead times than other pharmaceutical products,37 and the
FDA imposes particularly rigorous GMP requirements on biologics.38 For
instance, the agency demands that preapproval clinical trials use batches
produced in a commercial-scale manufacturing facility,39 which means that,
once those facilities actually begin producing biologics for the market, they
may use methods that no longer represent the state-of-the-art.4 0 The FDA
allows a limited exception for products that are "in short supply,' '41 but the
stringency of GMP requirements applicable to drugs and especially biologics
still represents a potential obstacle to the uninterrupted supply of therapeutic
products approved for marketing.42

approval requirements applied to drugs and biologics. See Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 123(0, 111 Stat. 2296, 2324.
37. See Brown, supra note 2, at AI ("Vaccines are also harder to make. They're derived
from bacteria and viruses, which are trickier to handle than inert chemicals. Many require
elaborate processing to keep them safe, uncontaminated but still active. It takes Aventis Pasteur
almost a year to make a batch of Td."); see also Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 984-85
("The effects of vaccine supply interruptions are exacerbated by limited industry inventories.
Vaccines have a short shelf life (an average of two years) ....[E]ven under the most urgent
circumstances, a large emergency vaccine order requires several weeks to process.").
38. See 21 C.F.R. pts. 600-610 (2002); PETERBARTONHUTr& RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD
AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 664 (2d ed. 1991) ("Once the specific plant has been
approved....it is more difficult to secure approval of an alternative manufacturing site for a
biological than for a new drug."); Gary E. Gamerman, Regulation ofBiologicsManufacturing:
Questioning the Premise, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 213 (1994) (criticizing the FDA's continued
insistence on more intensive scrutiny of manufacturing for biological products as compared to
drugs); Edward L. Korwek, Human BiologicalDrugRegulation: Past,Present,and Beyond the
Year 2000, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 123, 132-34 (Supp. 1995); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-28
(2000) (imposing special recordkeeping and reporting requirements on manufacturers of
childhood vaccines); Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 540-47 (1988).
39. See NeoRX Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202, 206 (D.N.J. 1994); Gary
B. Ebbert et al., Overview of Vaccine Manufacturing and Quality Assurance, in VACCINEs 40,
41 (Stanley A. Plotkin &Walter A. Orenstein eds., 3d ed. 1999); Mowery & Mitchell, supra note
9, at 986-87; Paul D. Parkman & M. Carolyn Hardegree, Regulation and Testing of Vaccines,
in VACCINES, supra, at 1131, 1136-37.
40. See Gamerman, supra note 38, at 231 (explaining that a biologics manufacturer
"face[s] the problem of having to build and staff a facility that will not be state-of-the-art by the
time it is needed for full production and distribution"); id. at 231-32 n.98 ("[A] manufacturer of
a sub-unit vaccine was required to repeat its preclinical and Phase I studies completely when it
switched to a purification scheme that permitted greater product yield, purity, homogeneity, and
stability.").
41. See 21 C.F.R. § 601.22 (2002); cf.Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 987 (noting
that "this provision is rarely invoked by U.S.-licensed producers of vaccines").
42. See Brown, supra note 2, at Al ("As with the making of drugs, vaccine production is
heavily regulated by the [FDA], and companies must periodically spend large amounts ofmoney
on plant improvements to meet the FDA's requirements. Many complain that they can't recoup
their investment through sales."); Scott Gottlieb, Getting Drugs Made Can Be Harder Than
Creating Them, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan 14, 2002, at 19, 22 (describing the lack of adequate
manufacturing facilities for monoclonal antibodies such as Enbrel, and blaming the problem on
slow and expensive FDA inspections)
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B. Cost ContainmentBackfires
The federal government buys substantial quantities of prescription drugs
for use in a variety of programs. By virtue of its sheer size, the government can
negotiate for favorable prices, at least if it can coordinate its purchases.43 In
addition, state governments have become more active in trying to use their
leverage to limit expenditures on pharmaceuticals." Public and private insurers
are more likely to reimburse or supply pharmaceuticals regarded as essential
to health, but the desire to guarantee patient access unwittingly may weaken the
industry's economic incentives for producing adequate supplies of these
therapeutic agents. Bulk purchases by government agencies or pressures
exerted by large insurers can depress prices to the point that it makes little
business sense for a company to continue manufacturing a particular product.
Vaccines do not represent a terribly lucrative business compared to other
pharmaceutical lines.4" Indeed, their success in eradicating dreaded infectious
diseases of the past creates a risk of eventual obsolescence, as had happened
with the smallpox vaccine until very recently. Government-mandated
immunizations for children ensure a steady demand for many vaccines, but, in
contrast to prevalent chronic diseases that may require daily and indefinite use,
individuals may receive a particular vaccine on only a few occasions over the
course of their lifetimes.' To make matters worse, many individuals do not

43. See Shankar Vedantam, HHS's Varying Costsfor Cipro Criticized,WASH. POST, Oct.
26, 2001, at A 16 (reporting that the government negotiated a contract to purchase an antibiotic
for the treatment of anthrax for 95¢ per dose-far less than the retail price of over $4 and the
manufacturer's original offer of $1.83 but more than twice the price paid by the federal
government under a preexisting program).
44. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219, 222-26 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (invalidating the federal government's waiverof certain Medicaid requirements applicable
to Vermont's program); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66,71-72, 8485 (1st Cir. 2001) (refusing to enjoin Maine's program), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 2657 (2002);
Francis B. Palumbo, The Role of the State as a Drug Purchaser,56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 267, 27680 (2001). Governments in other countries, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, play an
even more central role in drug purchasing.
45. See Brown, supra note 2, at A l ("[V]accines historically have been high-volume, lowprofit items in drug companies' catalogues. This is still true of older vaccines."); id. ("Only the
newer, still under-patent products such as the chickenpox vaccine ($39 a dose, at the government
discounted price) and the pneumococcal vaccine ($46) offer the kind of profit margins
pharmaceutical companies are accustomed to."); id. ("[T]he field generally isn't viewed as a
money-maker. Vaccines account for only 1.5 percent of the global pharmaceutical market.").
46. See id. ("Among the economic disincentives is the fact that vaccines are given on a
rigid schedule and only occasionally-far different from products such as antidepressants and
cholesterol-lowering drugs, which are taken for years and whose 'target' populations are
constantly expanding."); id. ("Moreover, vaccine hazards stand out starkly in populations in
which the diseases the vaccines prevent are no longer visible."); Terence Chea, Vaccines Are Hot
Topic, but Not Hot Investment, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2001, at El ("The drug industry would
rather develop pills that people take every day for years than a vaccine taken once in a
lifetime.").
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purchase vaccines, relying instead on supplies made available by public health
departments.47

In 1993, Congress created the Childhood Immunization Initiative, which
ensured free vaccines to all eligible children. 48 This statute directed the CDC

to increase their purchasing of pediatric vaccines but limited price increases on
government contracts to the rate of inflation. 49 These and other efforts to secure
deep discounts or otherwise control prices could, however, backfire by
"accelerat[ing] the exit of U.S. producers from the industry, further reducing
the number of suppliers of critical vaccines."' One might understand the
problem as the flipside of rationing expensive health care interventions: if
prices become sufficiently depressed as a result of government efforts to ensure
inexpensive access for patients, manufacturers may no longer bother to produce
the product or at least devote fewer resources to it than more lucrative lines of

business,5 which then creates a problem of scarcity. Along similar lines,
declining insurance reimbursements for mammograms, which may no longer
cover the cost of performing this diagnostic test, have caused several mammography centers to close their doors.52

47. See Brown, supra note 2, at Al ("[B]ecause the federal government buys so much,
discount pricing is the rule, not the exception, in the vaccine market.").
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396s(a)(1)(A) (2000); see also Walter A. Orenstein et al., Public
Health Considerations-United States, in VACCINES, supra note 39, at 1006, 1013
("Approximately 60% ofvaccines routinely recommended for children are purchased with public
funds through federal contracts negotiated by the CDC with the vaccine manufacturers.... The
typical discount has been approximately 50% off the published catalog prices.").
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396s(d)(3)(B).
50. Mowery & Mitchell, supranote 9, at 984; see also id. at 980 n.8 (The statute "may well
cause established U.S. vaccine producers to focus future development efforts on vaccines for
adults rather than for children."); Ira Carnahan, Blame the Governmentforthe Vaccine Shortage,
FORBES, Mar. 18, 2002, at 50. Conversely, the assured demand and government-run distribution
network may help stabilize the market and perhaps attract new entrants. See Mowery & Mitchell,
supra note 9, at 988; Kathleen Day, Vaccine Maker Gets a Shot in the Arm, WASH. POST, Mar.
11, 1996, at F 17 (noting that "federal and state government buy 60 percent of vaccines"); see
also Hurley v. Lederle Labs., 863 F.2d 1173, 1177 (5th Cir. 1988); GAO, supra note 22, at 6 n.5
(noting that the manufacturer of the Td booster vaccine refuses to sell it to the CDC at the capped
price).
51. See Barry R. Bloom, The United States Needs a National Vaccine Authority, 265
SCIENCE 1378, 1378 (1994) (conceding that the public "interest is best served by multiple
manufacturers and competition, not by monopsonistic or universal government purchase"); see
also Patricia M. Danzon & Li-Wei Chao, Does Regulation Drive out Competition in
PharmaceuticalMarkets?, 43 J.L. &ECON. 311,319 (2000) ("The lower the originator product's
price when the patent expires, the lower the potential profit margin for a generic competitor
pursuing a price competition strategy, and hence the less attractive is the market for competitive
generic entry."); Jerry Stanton, Comment, Lesson for the United States from Foreign Price
Controls on Pharmaceuticals,16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 149, 167-71 (2000); Vanessa Fuhrmans &
Gautam Naik, Drug Makers Fight to Fend Off Cuts in European Prices, WALL ST. J., June 7,
2002, at A l (reporting that companies may "withhold innovative new treatments from European
markets" if governments there insist on unprofitable pricing).
52. See Barbara Martinez, Screening Crunch: As More Women Seek Mammograms, Many
Have to Wait Months, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2000, at Al.
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In the field of organ transplantation, federal and state statutes prohibit the
sale of most human tissues,53 which several commentators have criticized given
the serious scarcity of donated organs.5 4 The prohibition on commercialization
represents an extreme version of the cost containment measures used by
governments in an effort to ensure affordable drugs, and it may create scarcity
in much the same way." Imagine that the government prohibited drug
manufacturers from generating any profit on sales of vaccines and other critical
pharmaceuticals, allowing them to recoup only their expenses for raw materials
and counting on their corporate public-spiritedness to continue supplying the
market. Although members of the pharmaceutical industry participate in a
variety of charitable activities,56 altruism alone will not maintain product lines
that generate little or no profit.57

53. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000); see also Susan H. Denise, Note, Regulating the Sale of
Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1022-32 (1985) (discussing the origins of this prohibition
and parallel state legislation).
54. See Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, The Economics and Ethics of Alternative
CadavericOrgan ProcurementPolicies, 8 YALEJ. ON REG. 403,408-10 (1991); Lloyd R. Cohen,
Increasingthe Supply of Transplant Organs: Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1 (1989); Shelby E. Robinson, Comment, Organsfor Sale? An Analysis of Proposed
Systems for CompensatingOrganProviders,70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1019, 1035-50 (1999); see also
Deborah Josefson, AMA Considers Whether to Payfor Donationof Organs, 324 BRIT. MED. J.
1541 (2002); Susan Okie, Surgeons Back Study ofPaymentfor Organs:PlanAimed as Boosting

DonorRates, WASH.

POST,

Apr. 30, 2002, at A3.

55. See Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creationof a Futures
Market in Bodily Organs, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 19, 76 (1994); see also James F. Blumstein, The
Use ofFinancialIncentives in Medical Care:The Case ofCommerce in TransplantableOrgans,
3 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 19 (1993) ("If people are not inclined to donate [organs], then that means
they will require more in the way of an inducement. Prospective buyers would have to raise the
price."); id. at 21-24 (distinguishing between supply-side and demand-side issues); Julia D.
Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 174-85, 192-200, 221 (2000)
(explaining that, even if donors act altruistically, other participants in the organ transplant
business do not).
56. See Theresa Agovino, PrivateGroups SubsidizingMedicinesfor World's Sick, Hous.
CHRON., Feb. 17, 2002, at 8; Bruce Japsen, Abbott, Rivals Offer a Discount Drug Card, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 10, 2002, § 3, at I ("Abbott, for example, donated more than $40 million in
pharmaceutical products to 85,000 people free of charge last year under a patient assistance
program in place since 1996."); Seven Drug Companies Offer Discount Card to Elderly, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2002, at C3 ("Under its long-standing Patient Assistance Program, Merck...
offers many of the company's medicines free of charge to any patient without prescription drug
coverage who has an annual individual income less than $18,000 .... ").
57. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Public Health Groups Act Like Companies in Bid to Fight
Diseases in PoorNations, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2001, at B3 ("The same dilemma stands in the
way of investing in treatments for diseases caused by bioterrorism agents-the uncertain market
discourages private investment."); Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Cosmetic Saves a Curefor Sleeping
Sickness, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at Al ("It has been known for more than 10 years that
eflornithine is a virtual miracle cure for trypanosomiasis, but stocks have run out because early
hopes that it would help fight cancer have been dashed and medical production has stopped.");
see also Justin Gillis, DrugmakersStep Forwardin BioterrorFight,WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2001,
at A18 (explaining public relations benefit and other motivations behind company offers to
provide free supplies of antibiotics against anthrax); Charles Ornstein, Drug FirmsRush to Offer

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54: 741

C. RationingFinite Supplies
A vast literature exists about health care rationing, but it focuses almost
exclusively on scarcity of financial resources that requires trade-offs among
patients, choice of interventions, and other uses of the money. 8 Commentators
have paid relatively little attention to the "microallocation" questions that arise
when, no matter the ability to pay, there are not enough units of a health care
intervention to go around. 9 The one major exception to this lack of attention
is the field of organ transplantation, which actually poses both sets of rationing
difficulties. 60 Given the high costs and sometimes poor chances of success

Free Anthrax Antibiotics, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2001, at A3 (same).
58. See, e.g., HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION:
RATIONING HOSPITAL CARE (1984); ROBERT H. BLANK, RATIONING MEDICINE (1988); PAUL T.
MENZEL, STRONG MEDICINE: THE ETHICAL RATIONING OF HEALTH CARE (1990); Daniel Callahan,
TransformingMortality: Technology and the Allocation ofResources, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 205,
219-23 (1991); Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1449 (1994);
Mark A. Hall, RationingHealth Careat the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (1994); Symposium,
Caringfor the Uninsuredand Underinsured,265 JAMA 2441 (1991); Symposium, The Law and
Policy of Health CareRationing: Models and Accountability, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1505 (1992).
59. See Maxwell J. Mehlman, RationingExpensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments, 1985
WIS. L. REV. 239, 244-45 ("Allocating medical treatments that are in short supply ... are
difficult and ethically troublesome. Generally, however, the options are circumscribed by the
available medical resources. The only question is who should receive them. Economists call this
a 'microallocation' problem." (footnotes omitted)). Professor Mehlman's article, like most others
that discuss health care rationing, addresses a different question:
The current debate ...focuses on a different type of constraint-cost.... Under both
cost-based rationing and technical or experimental scarcity, microallocation decisions
are needed to determine who receives treatment. However, cost-based rationing
entails additional decisions on whether, and to what extent, to restrict the availability
of treatment on grounds of cost. These are termed "macroallocation" decisions.
Id. at 245; see also Roger W. Evans, Health Care Technology and the Inevitability ofResource
Allocation and Rationing Decisions, 249 JAMA 2047 (1983); David C. Hadorn & Robert H.
Brook, The Health Care Resource Allocation Debate: Defining Our Terms, 266 JAMA 3328,
3328 (1991) ("Only two types of medical and surgical services are currently scarce relative to
demand: organs for transplantation and, sometimes, beds in intensive care units.... Use of the
word rationing in the contemporary policy debate has clearly transcended [its] original
meaning." (endnotes omitted)); Michael D. Reagan, Health Care Rationing: What Does it
Mean?, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1149, 1150-51 (1988).
60. See RENEE C. Fox & JUDITH P. SWAZEY, SPARE PARTS: ORGAN REPLACEMENT IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY 73-92 (1992); George J. Annas, The Prostitute, the Playboy, and the Poet:
RationingSchemes for Organ Transplantation,75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 187, 189 (1985); Roger
W. Evans et al., The PotentialSupply of Organ Donors: An Assessment of the Efficiency of
OrganProcurementEfforts in the UnitedStates, 267 JAMA 239,245 (1992); Richard A. Rettig,
The Politics of Organ Transplantation:A Parableof Our Time, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
191, 191-92, 218-21 (1989); John A. Robertson, Supply and Distribution of Hearts for
Transplantation:Legal, Ethical,and Policy Issues, 75 CIRCULATION 77, 86 (1987); H. Gilbert
Welch & Eric B. Larson, Dealing with Limited Resources: The Oregon Decision to Curtail
Fundingfor Organ Transplantation,319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 171, 173 (1988); see also David
Mechanic, ProfessionalJudgment and the RationingofMedical Care, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1713,
1752 (1992) ("The allocation of scarce resources, as in the case of organ transplantation, is not
prototypical of the majority of rationing decisions made within our vast health care system....
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associated with organ transplantation, some have questioned whether this
intervention represents a sensible expenditure of scarce health care resources.
If society answers that macroallocational question in the affirmative, then, at
least as long as shortages persist, it becomes necessary to face the
microallocational question and decide which patients will receive the available
organs.
Microallocation problems pose particularly difficult choices.6 ' How does
one select among various patients when inadequate supplies prevent treating
all of those in need? The federal government has established an elaborate
allocation system for donated organs,62 but no similar framework exists for the
rationing of critical pharmaceuticals when shortages arise.63 One could
distribute such medications on a first-come, first-served basis or using some

other random allocation system. In 1953, for instance, "the British Ministry of
Health instituted a national lottery in order to allocate the scarce supplies of
polio vaccine." 6'4 Half a century later, initial shortages of a new treatment for
65
hepatitis C required the establishment of a special patient registration system.

These decisions detract attention from the far more numerous circumstances under which more
routine types of rationing occur.").
61. See JOHN F. KILNER, WHO LIVES? WHO DIES? ETHICAL CRITERIA INPATIENT SELECTION

(1990); AMA Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Ethical Considerationsin the Allocation
ofOrgans and OtherScarceMedicalResourcesAmong Patients,155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
29, 35 (1995); James F. Childress, Triage in Neonatal Intensive Care: The Limitations of a
Metaphor, 69 VA. L. REV. 547 (1983); Volker H. Schmidt, Selection of Recipientsfor Donor
Organs in TransplantMedicine, 23 J. MED. & PHIL. 50 (1998); Basil A. Stoll, Choosing Between
CancerPatients,16 J. MED. ETHICS 71 (1990); Robert D. Truog, Triage in the ICU, HASTINGS
CTR. REP., May-June 1992, at 13; see also GUIDO CALABRESI &PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES
182-90 (1978) (comparing different countries' approaches to allocating scarce dialysis

machines); K.M. Boyd & B.T. Potter, Prioritiesin the Allocation of Scarce Resources, 12 J.
MED. ETHICS 197 (1986) (discussing a case involving competing needs for a single renal dialysis
machine).
62. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 274, 1320b-8 (2000); James F. Blumstein, Federal Organ
TransplantationPolicy: A Timefor Reassessment?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 451 (1989); Gail L.

Daubert, Note, Politics, Policies, and Problems with Organ Transplantation: Government
Regulation Needed to Ration Organs Equitably, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 459, 463-74 (1998)
(summarizing the central features of the federal allocation program). Recently, the federal
government issued controversial new rules that altered some of the allocation criteria. See 63
Fed. Reg. 16,296 (Apr. 2, 1998) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 121 (2002)); Laura E. McMullen,

Comment, Equitable Allocation of Human Organs: An Examination of the New Federal
Regulation, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 405 (1999).
63. See Anthrax Attacks Leave States Little Better Prepared,USA TODAY, Jan. 3, 2002, at
I OA ("With the possible exception of Colorado, no state has rules for rationing antibiotics or
vaccines when there are not enough to go around .... ). A recently drafted model public health
law provides authority to ration critical pharmaceuticals and give precedence to health care
workers and disaster response personnel. See Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
§ 505(b), (c) (draft Dec. 21, 2001), http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf
(last visited Nov. 15, 2002).
64. GERALD R. WINSLOW, TRIAGE AND JUSTICE 147 (1982).
65. See Geeta Anand, Schering-Ploughto Start Wait Listfor HepatitisDrug,WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 16, 2002, at B14.
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Most rationing schemes emphasize relying solely on medical criteria, but
even these may point in different directions. Should the scarce resource go to
the sickest patient or the one most likely to recover completely if treated at an
early stage? When the vaccine against hepatitis B first became available, the
combination of limited supplies and high costs led to recommendations for its
use only in "high-risk groups., 66 Nonetheless, the use of seemingly objective
and neutral medical criteria, even if such criteria could be established,67 may
lead to inequities in access.68 Researchers have found, for example, that
minorities do not respond as well to certain medications, which may result from
the fact that sponsors of investigational new drugs rarely enrolled patients from
minority populations in clinical trials.69
Although medical ethicists generally reject using social worth criteria,
should the patient's age (or perhaps ability to pay) factor into the choice? In
recent years, recurring shortages of the annual vaccines against influenza have
resulted in recommendations that otherwise healthy adults delay seeking
inoculations so as to ensure adequate doses for the elderly.7 ° In the face of

66. See INST. OF MED., NEW VACCINE DEVELOPMENT: ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES 1:267-68
(1985); see also KILNER, supra note 61, at 124 ("An imminent-death criterion, for instance,
partly determined the distribution of insulin in the days when it was still scarce."). In the
transplantation context, one suggestion for responding to scarcity involves the salvage of
diseased or defective (so-called "extended criteria") organs for patients who otherwise would
receive a low priority because of their poor prognosis. See Paul Engstrom, "Marginal"Organs
Can Be Another Shot at Life, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2001, at S6.
67. See Lars Noah, Medicine's Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of
Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373 (2002) (discussing endemic
medical uncertainty); Lars Noah, PigeonholingIllness:MedicalDiagnosisas a Legal Construct,
50 HASTINGS L.J. 241 (1999) (discussing the social construction of disease).
68. For instance, in the context ofkidney transplantations, human leukocyte antigen (HLA)
matching improves success rates but results in serious distributional inequities for minority
patients who do not match the largely non-minority donor supply. See Ian Ayres et al., Unequal
RacialAccess to Kidney Transplantation,46 VAND. L. REV. 805, 815-36, 849-53 (1993); Robert
S. Gaston et al., RacialEquity in Renal Transplantation:The DisparateImpact of HLA-Based
Allocation, 270 JAMA 1352, 1353-55 (1993); Barbara A. Noah, The Invisible Patient, 2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 121, 127-28 (book review).
69. See Lars Noah, The Coming PharmacogenomicsRevolution: Tailoring Drugs to Fit
Patients'Genetic Profiles,43 JURIMETRICSJ. (forthcoming Jan. 2003) (explaining that advances
in pharmacogenetics may exacerbate these discrepancies in the future). After the anthrax attacks,
employees of the United States Postal Service complained that they had received poorer
treatment than Senate staffers and suggested that it had something to do with their race and
socioeconomic status. See All Things Considered:Postal Workers QuestionEquality ofMedical
Treatment for the Poor (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, Jan. 15, 2002), available at 2002 WL
3494675.
70. See CDC, Delayed Influenza Vaccine Availability for 2001-02 Season and
Supplemental Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, 50
MORBIDITY& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 582,583 (2001) (adding that priority also should be given
to other high-risk individuals and health care workers); CDC, Delayed Supply of Influenza
Vaccine and Adjunct ACIP Influenza Vaccine Recommendations for the 2000-01 Influenza
Season, 49 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 619, 620-21 (2000). Physicians also reported
incidents of price gouging. See Elliott, supra note 5, at 2.
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concerns about shortages of the DTP vaccine in the mid-1980s, the CDC
recommended that pediatricians delay administering booster shots.7 It has
taken similar steps to cope with the latest round of shortages,72 resulting, for

instance, in an inability among adults to get tetanus shots.73
Finally, should purely medical criteria give way in the face of a national
emergency? During World War II, the inability to synthesize penicillin coupled
with a sudden surge in demand resulted in serious supply shortages and
required rationing to facilitate the war effort.74 At present, some controversy
exists about providing initial doses of scarce vaccines to public health and
emergency response officials.75

Rationing difficulties often arise because ofmacroallocational decisions or,
more typically, indecision. Aside from insuperable technological barriers, we

could avoid microallocation problems by devoting greater resources to securing
adequate supplies. For the most part, vaccines and antibiotics do not represent
expensive or exotic life-saving technologies. On the contrary, they are among

71.

See CDC, Diphtheria-Tetanus-Pertussis Vaccine Shortage-United States, 33
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 695, 696 (1984); CDC, Diphtheria-Tetanus-Pertussis
Vaccine Shortage, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 103, 104 (1985). The agency
rescinded its recommendation less than six months later after one of the manufacturers began
distributing supplies again. See CDC, Reinstatement of Regular Diphtheria-Tetanus-Pertussis
Vaccine Schedule, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 231, 232 (1985).
72. See CDC, Recommended ChildhoodImmunization Schedule-UnitedStates, 2002, 51
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 31, 33 (2002) ("As a result of the vaccine supply
shortage, deferral of some doses of tetanus and diphtheria toxoids (Td), diphtheria and tetanus
toxoids and acellular pertussis vaccine (DTaP), and pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV) has
been recommended .... "); CDC, Shortage of Varicella and Measles, Mumps and Rubella
Vaccines and Interim Recommendations from the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 190, 190-91 (2002); Brown, supra note 2,
at AI ("[T]he CDC has been rationing supplies and changing immunization schedules to ensure
that all children get at least some doses of every vaccine they need.").
73. See CDC, DeferralofRoutine Booster Doses of Tetanus and DiphtheriaToxoids for
Adolescents and Adults, 50 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 418 (2001); Geraldine M.
McQuillan et al., Serologic Immunity to Diphtheria and Tetanus in the United States, 136
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 660, 666 (2002); Brown, supra note 2, at Al ("[T]he classic 'tetanus
shot' people get when they have dirty wounds.., is now available only in emergency rooms.");
Andrea Petersen, Vaccine Shortage Hits Adults, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2002, at DI ("Adults
needing tetanus-diphtheria boosters-which they should get every 10 years-will probably have
to wait until the end of this year.").
74. See GLADYS L. HOBBY, PENICILLIN: MEETING THE CHALLENGE 141-45 (1985);
WINSLOW, supra note 64, at 7-8; Childress, supra note 61, at 551-52; Note, Scarce Medical
Resources, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 620, 664 n.241 (1969).
75. See Bradley Graham & Mike Allen, MilitarySmallpox VaccinationsPlanned,WASH.
POST, Nov. 15, 2002, at Al 6; Guy Gugliotta, Pentagonto Resume Anthrax Vaccinations, WASH.
POST, June 29, 2002, at A3; see also supra note 63.
76. See Mehlman, supra note 59, at 245 ("Assuming there is no technological or
experimental barrier to providing additional medical resources, availability is a function of cost.
Increasing the supply of these resources to avoid the need for rationing would require restrictions
on the supply of other resources .... ).
MORBIDITY

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

17

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54: 741

the most cost-effective health care interventions available today,77 but their very

success may have bred public complacency, and the resulting failure to give
sufficient priority to ensuring the continued availability of these older medical
technologies may imperil the public health. In the case of rare diseases, the
federal government has extended special incentives designed to encourage the

development of so-called "orphan" drugs.78 Notwithstanding narrow patient
populations, a steady demand for certain orphan drugs coupled with generous
market exclusivity provisions have resulted in several commercially successful
products.79 Off-patent pediatric vaccines, antibiotics, and other critical
pharmaceuticals designed for only occasional use by large patient populations
may represent the real orphans in need of additional protection.
III. STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE

In response to the latest round of vaccine shortages, interested parties have
begun serious efforts to find solutions to the problem. 0 The previous discussion

suggests a pair of responses. First, the FDA needs to facilitate rather than
impede the production of critical pharmaceuticals.81 The agency now does a

77. See CDC, Impact of Vaccines Universally Recommendedfor Children-UnitedStates,
1990-1998, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 243, 244-45 (1999); Mark A. Miller &
Alan R. Hinman, Cost-Benefit and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Vaccine Policy, in VACCINES,
supra note 39, at 1074, 1085 ("Economic analyses of immunizations have shown them to be
among the best investments in health."); see also Carolyn Buxton Bridges et al., Effectiveness
and Cost-Benefit of Influenza Vaccination ofHealthy Working Adults, 284 JAMA 1655, 1661
(2000); Craig C. White et al., Benefits, Risks and Costs ofImmunizationfor Measles, Mumps and
Rubella, 75 AM. J. PUB.HEALTH 739, 740 (1985).
78. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (2000)); see also Baker Norton Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 132 F. Supp.
2d 30, 31 (D.D.C. 2001) ("Since the passage of the Orphan Drug Act, the FDA has approved at
least 172 orphan drugs and biological products ....); Carolyn H. Asbury, The Orphan Drug
Act: The First7 Years, 265 JAMA 893 (1991); Naomi Aoki, The Priceof Success: OrphanDrug
Act Has SpurredAdvances-and Disputes, BOSTON GLOBE, July 25, 2001, at F 1.
79. See Peter S. Arno et al., Rare Diseases,Drug Development, andAIDS: The Impact of
the Orphan Drug Act, 73 MILBANK Q. 231, 241-43 (1995); Ann Gibbons, Billion-Dollar
Orphans:Prescriptionfor Trouble, 248 SCIENCE 678 (1990); Abbey S. Meyers, The Impact of
Orphan Drug Regulation on Patients and Availability, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 9, 9-10 (1992);
Larry Thompson, The High Cost of Rare Diseases, WASH. POST, June 25, 1991, at Z 10.
80. See GAO, supra note 22, at 24-34; Brown, supra note 2, at Al ("[T]here have been
numerous meetings among representatives of the federal government, public health departments,
drug companies and medical societies to try to come up with ways to avert future shortages.
Financial incentives to vaccine makers, changes in regulation, bigger stockpiles and expanded
liability protection are all being considered."); James Collins, Senate PanelHearsCallforAction
on Childhood Vaccine Shortages, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 13, 2002, at A11; Michael
Tackett, Shortages a Threat to Routine of Immunizations, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 12, 2002, § 1, at 8;
Editorial, Averting Vaccine Disaster,WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2002, at A24.
81. See Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 998 ("Reduction in the stringency of
regulation is unlikely, but expanded collaboration between public biomedical research agencies
in the United States and foreign or domestic firms in clinical trials and licensure could ease the
licensing barriers to entry."); id. at 985 ("[T]he assessment of supply interruption risk and
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better job of getting essential drugs to the market, but it needs to help keep
them on the market as well. When it initially licenses products, the FDA gives
priority to reviewing drugs and biologics intended for the treatment of life82
threatening conditions for which effective therapies do not yet exist; it needs
to do the same when it inspects facilities and resolves disputes involving GMP
requirements. At the very least, the FDA must demonstrate additional
flexibility in case of a serious supply shortage.83 Second, cost-containment
strategies need to give way to some mechanism for paying a premium for
critical pharmaceutical products or at least providing their manufacturers with
generous tax incentives. This Part considers other oft-mentioned solutions to
the scarcity problem, in roughly descending order of merit: insulating
manufacturers from tort liability, stockpiling supplies, and nationalizing part
of the industry.
A.

Removing the Liability Cloud

As is true with criticisms of excessive regulatory burdens, commentators
usually focus on the disincentives to research and development created by the

threat of tort liability,84 but these pressures also may have negative impacts on

policies to address this risk must look beyond the number of suppliers to consider policies
addressing vaccine stockpiles and FDA licensure of production facilities."); cf.id. at 986 ("The
very different product and process technologies associated with vaccines ... prevent entry by
'generic vaccine' producers without extensive clinical trials.").
82. See 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2000); 21 C.F.R. pts. 314(H), 601(E) (2002). The FDA also
simplified the approval requirements for products designed to treat victims of bioterrorism. See
67 Fed. Reg. 37,988 (May 31, 2002).
83. See Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 985 ("[T]he duration of previous supply
interruptions is attributable in large part to the amount of time required by the FDA to license
a new production facility. In a crisis, these licensure procedures could be accelerated somewhat
without reducing their stringency or public safety."); see also Freddy A. Jimenez, Enforcement
of the CurrentGood ManufacturingPracticesfor Solid OralDosageFormsAfter United States
v. Barr Laboratories, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 67, 71-72 (1997) (discussing a consent decree that
enjoined production of Warner-Lambert drugs pending the completion of GMP audits but
allowed continued production of "medically necessary" drugs-meaning those without a
therapeutic substitute-pending certification ofthe manufacturing facilities); Tamar Nordenberg,
Inside FDA: When a Drug Is in Short Supply, FDA CONSUMER, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 30 ("If
shutting down a plant while the manufacturer corrects problems could lead to a shortage of a
medically necessary drug, the agency may exempt that drug from the ban to keep it available.").
When it recently ordered a recall of processed tissues distributed by CryoLife because of
suspected bacterial contamination, the FDA allowed continuing distribution of heart valves, and
it authorized the resumption ofshipments ofother critical tissue products even before confirming
that the company had remedied its GMP problems. See Martha Brannigan, CryoLife Gains FDA
Approvalfor Some Sales, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2002, at B6.
84. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 21-23 (Polly
F. Harrison & Allan Rosenfield eds., 1996); Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of Product
Liability on New Drug Development, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON
SAFETY AND INNOVATION 334 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991); Susan F. Scharf,
Note, Orphan Drugs: The Question of Products Liability, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 491, 512-13
(1985).
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the supplies of existing therapeutic products. As Professor Richard Epstein
explained:
[I]f the number of false positives attributed to a vaccine rises
sufficiently, then the private costs imposed upon the manufacturer diverge from the social costs of the vaccine. Systematic underproduction results ....

If their losses from the line

of production exceed the profits that they can make from the
sale of vaccines, then they will leave the market.8 5

Subsequent research confirmed these predicted effects of tort liability on drug
prices and market concentration.86
Tort litigation may drive from the market notjust individual manufacturers
of multi-source drugs but also entire product lines." In the case of the
antinauseant drug Bendectin, which the FDA continues to regard as safe and

effective, the manufacturer withdrew the product rather than continue
defending its safety in the courts.88 The withdrawal of this drug two decades
ago left an unmet therapeutic need for pregnant women suffering from severe
nausea, which could result in weight loss and dehydration that sometimes
85. Richard A. Epstein, Legal Liabilityfor MedicalInnovation, 8 CARDOzO L. REV. 1139,
1154 (1987); see also id. at 1153 ("If in the aggregate the net gains are wiped out by the liability
costs, then the product will no longer be made. If some net gains survive, then fewer units will
be produced to reflect the changes in rules and some marginal consumers must do without.");
Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The HazardsofPublicRisk Management in the Courts,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 277,285-90 (1985). See generally STEVEN GARBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND
THE ECONOMICS OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND MEDICAL DEVICES

(1993).

86. See Richard L. Manning, Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Marketfor Childhood
Vaccines, 37 J.L. & ECON. 247,248,254-58,273 (1994); Richard L. Manning, ProductsLiability
andPrescriptionDrugPricesin Canadaand the UnitedStates, 40 J.L. &ECON. 203,234 (1997).
87. See Howard A. Denemark, Improving Litigation Against Drug Manufacturersfor
Failureto Warn Against PossibleSide Effects: Keeping Dubious Lawsuitsfrom Driving Good
Drugs Off the Market, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 413, 428-29 (1990); Note, A Question of
Competence: The JudicialRole in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals,103 HARV. L. REV. 773,
774-75 (1990); Linda A. Johnson, Wyeth Won't Resume Norplant Sales, AP ONLINE, July 26,
2002, availableat 2002 WL 24649116; Gina Kolata, Will the Lawyers Kill Off Norplant?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 1995, § 3, at 1; Tamar Lewin, Searle, Assailing Lawsuits, Halts US. Sales of
IntrauterineDevices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1986, § 1, at I ("With the company's withdrawal, this
type of birth control device [i.e., the IUD] will no longer be available in this country.").
88. See Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823,824 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Brown
v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal. 1988) ("Ben[de]ctin, the only antinauseant drug
available for pregnant women, was withdrawn from sale in 1983 because the cost of insurance
almost equalled the entire income from sale of the drug. Before it was withdrawn, the price of
Ben[de]ctin increased by over 300 percent."); Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation:A Case
Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 318-19 (1992); W. Kip Viscusi,
CorporateRisk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547, 584 (2000) ("The risk ofjuror
error coupled with high litigation costs led manufacturers to withdraw Bendectin from the market
notwithstanding the continuing assessment by the FDA and the scientific community that
Bendectin provides benefits exceeding its risks."); see also Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification,
86 IOWAL. REV. 1601, 1656-57 (2001).
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necessitated hospitalization.89 More recently, in the face of lawsuits and
plummeting demand triggered by the resulting adverse publicity, the manufacturer of a vaccine against Lyme disease decided to withdraw its FDA-approved
product from the market.9"
One solution would replace tort liability with alternatives modeled on
workers' compensation programs. As mentioned previously, Congress enacted

the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act in response to fears of critical
vaccine shortages and dramatic price increases.9" Manufacturers of listed

vaccines must pay an excise tax to fund an administrative compensation

system,92 and the legislation adds procedural and substantive barriers that are

designed to discourage the filing of tort claims.93 This mechanism appears to
have succeeded in stabilizing prices and stemming further exit from the
market,94 though recent litigation involving vaccines or injuries not explicitly
covered by the program has shaken some of the confidence that manufacturers
have had about the extent of their protection from liability.95 Some commenta-

tors have proposed similar compensation systems for other types of drug

89. See Gina Kolata, ControversialDrugMakes a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2000,
at F I (adding that a generic version of Bendectin may soon be introduced in the United States
market).
90. See Sole Lyme Vaccine Is Pulled Off Market, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2002, at C5.
91. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344; Victor E.
Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc
Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 387, 388-89, 394 (1987); Mary Beth
Neraas, Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A Solution to the
Vaccine Liability Crisis?, 63 WASH. L. REv. 149, 151-52, 165 (1988).
92. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4131-4132 (2000).
93. See Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 U.S. 268, 269-71 (1995); Schafer v. Am. Cyanamid
Co., 20 F.3d 1,2-3 (Ist Cir. 1994); see also 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2001) (Vaccine Injury Table);
O'Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170 (1st Cir. 1996) (rejecting challenges to the agency's revisions
of the Table); Beard v. HHS, 43 F.3d 659 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that an injury to a parent was
not covered by the Act); Lisa J. Steel, Note, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program:Is This the Best We Can Do for Our Children?,63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 144,159-71
(1994) (discussing problems with implementation). See generally Russell G. Donaldson,
Annotation, ConstructionandApplicationofNationalChildhood Vaccine InjuryAct, 129 A.L.R.
Fed. 1 (1996 & Supp. 2002).
94. See H.R.REP. No. 101-247 (1989), reprintedin 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2235; Edmund W.
Kitch et al., US. Law, in VACCINES, supra note 39, at 1165, 1181; Derry Ridgway, No-Fault
Vaccine Insurance: Lessonsfrom the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 24 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 59, 76 (1999); see also Edmund L. Andrews, A Major Revival in

Research on Vaccines, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1990, at D7.
95. See Brown, supra note 2, at AI ("[M]any drug companies now fear that the program
won't shield them from a new wave of lawsuits arising from the rumors of new, unproved,
vaccine complications."); see also Bruce G. Gellin & William Schaffner, Editorial, The Risk of
Vaccination-TheImportance of "Negative "Studies, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 372 (2001); Sandra
Blakeslee, Panel Cautions Against Mercury Preservative,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2001, at A18
(noting concerns about thimerosal used in vaccines). Congress soon may amend the statute to
extend its coverage. See Dan Morgan, HomelandBillRiderAidsDrugmakers,WASH. POST, Nov.
15, 2002, at A7.
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products, 96 or, as happened in the case of the swine flu vaccine, the federal
government could agree to indemnify manufacturers who supply products used
in a mass immunization campaign.97

A less cumbersome but equally controversial reform would give pharmaceutical manufacturers the benefit of a regulatory compliance defense.98 A
couple of states have enacted legislation designed to limit tort claims against
pharmaceutical products. 99 Separately, in response to concerns about maintaining adequate supplies, essentially all jurisdictions exempt blood from strict

products liability.'00 These "blood shield" statutes also protect commercial
suppliers of blood-derived products from strict liability claims.'0 1 Blood
96. See Andrew R. Klein, A Legislative Alternative to "No Cause" Liability in Blood
Products Litigation, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 107, 111-35 (1995); H. William Smith, III, Note,
Vaccinating AIDS Vaccine ManufacturersAgainst ProductLiability, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
207, 246-54 (1992); see also Gregory C. Jackson, Comment, PharmaceuticalProductLiability
May Be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to ConcurrentRegulation, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 199, 235-37 (1992) (suggesting such an approach for all drug products).
97. See National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat.
1113 (repealed 1978); see also Ducharme v. Merrill-Nat'l Labs., 574 F.2d 1307, 1309-10 (5th
Cir. 1978) (rejecting constitutional objections to granting tort immunity to vaccine
manufacturers); Thomas E. Baynes, Jr., Liabilityfor Vaccine Related Injuries: Public Health
ConsiderationsandSome Reflections on the Swine Flu Experience, 21 ST. Louis U. L.J. 44, 6274 (1977). This program turned into something of a fiasco. After a number of vaccine recipients
reported developing Guillain-Barre syndrome, the immunization program ceased, and the tort
litigation against the government commenced. See, e.g., Novak v. United States, 865 F.2d 718
(6th Cir. 1989); Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428 (8th Cir. 1984); Unthank v. United States,
732 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1984); see also Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal Compensationfor
Vaccination Induced Injuries, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 169, 180-81, 184-85 (1986). The
United States paid out almost $100 million in claims. See David Brown, A Shot in the Dark:

Swine Flu's Vaccine Lessons, WASH. POST, May 27, 2002, at A9.
98. See Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in
Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147 (2000); W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient
PharmaceuticalLitigation: An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance
Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1437, 1478-80 (1994); see also Carole A. Loftin, Note,
Expansion of the Government ContractorDefense: Applying Boyle to Vaccine Manufacturers,
70 TEX. L. REV. 1261, 1280-96 (1992).

99. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5) (West 2000) (treating FDA drug approval
as a conclusive defense absent evidence of fraud), invalidated by Taylor v. Gate Pharms., 639
N.W.2d 45, 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 2000) (creating a
rebuttable presumption of adequate warning). A handful of other states provide an FDA
compliance defense against only punitive damage claims. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12701(A) (West 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.801(C) (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.927 (1) (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2(1) (1996).

100. See Michael J. Miller, Note, Strict Liability, Negligence and the StandardofCarefor

Transfusion-Transmitted Disease, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 473, 488-90 (1994).

101. See McKee v. Cutter Labs., Inc., 866 F.2d 219, 221-22 (6th Cir. 1989); Coffee v.

Cutter Biological, 809 F.2d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 1987); Doe v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 698 F. Supp.

780, 784 (D. Minn. 1988); Rogers v. Miles Labs., Inc., 802 P.2d 1346, 1350-52 (Wash. 1991);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucTS LIABILITY § 19(c) (1998) ("Human blood
and human tissue, even when provided commercially, are not subject to the rules of this

Restatement."). But see JKB v. Armour Pharm. Co., 660 N.E.2d 602, 605-06 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996) (holding that state statute did not protect manufacturers).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol54/iss3/7

22

Noah: Triage in the Nation's Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling Scarcity of
2003]

TRIAGE IN THE NATION'S MEDICINE CABINET

suppliers remain subject to tort liability in cases of negligence, though many
courts define the standard of care as the relevant custom in the industry, which
makes it difficult for plaintiffs to recover. 10 2 Even so, recent litigation involving
contaminated blood factor concentrates
has created concerns about shortages
0 3
hemophiliacs.
by
needed
product
a
of
Suppliers of materials used in medical devices also have encountered
litigation that threatened to create scarcity problems. For instance, recipients of
defectively designed temporomandibular joint (TMJ) implants sued DuPont,
the supplier of the raw material used in the devices, after the finished product
manufacturer went bankrupt. The company ultimately prevailed in all of the
TMJ lawsuits filed against it for supplying raw materials.0 4 DuPont expended
significant resources, however, for its string of victories during the decade that
this litigation lasted, paying far more in legal fees than it ever earned on this
minor application.'0 5 Similarly, after the largest manufacturer of silicone-gel
breast implants filed for bankruptcy protection from the numerous products
liability claims,0 6 plaintiffs' lawyers began pursuing Dow Chemical as the
supplier of the raw silicone. 7 Dow Chemical usually prevailed, and the
lawsuits filed against other companies that had supplied silicone to other
manufacturers of breast implants have not succeeded.' 08 Even so, spooked by

102. See Smythe v. Am. Red Cross, 797 F. Supp. 147, 152-53 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Kozup v.
Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1055-60 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd in relevantpart, 851 F.2d
437, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Ward v. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y of Am., Inc., 963 P.2d
1031, 1036-37 (Alaska 1998); Spann v. Irwin Mem'l Blood Ctrs., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 364-66
(Ct. App. 1995); Brown v. United Blood Servs., 858 P.2d 391, 395-99 (Nev. 1993). But see Doe
v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 971 F.2d 375,382-84 (9th Cir. 1992) (denying the defendant's motion
for summary judgment); Doe v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 848 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (S.D. W. Va.
1994); Vuono v. N.Y. Blood Ctr., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 743, 747-48 (D. Mass. 1988); United Blood
Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 521-27 (Colo. 1992); Advincula v. United Blood Servs., 678
N.E.2d 1009, 1027-28 (I11.1996). See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability of Blood
Supplier or Donorfor Injury or Death Resulting from Blood Transfusion, 24 A.L.R.4th 508
(1983 & Supp. 2002).
103. See Andrew R. Klein, Beyond DES: Rejecting the Application of Market Share
Liability in Blood Products Litigation,68 TUL. L. REv. 883, 918-21 (1994); Eric Nauenberg &
Sean D. Sullivan, FirmBehavior in the US. Marketfor FactorVIII." A Needfor Policy?,39 Soc.
SC. & MED. 1591, 1593-94 (1994).
104. See In re TMJ Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 97 F.3d 1050, 1056-59 (8th Cir. 1996)
(collecting cases); Anguiano v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 44 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 1995);
LaMontagne v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 41 F.3d 846, 857-60 (2d Cir. 1994).
105. See Gary Taylor, A Discovery by DuPont:Hidden Costs of Winning, NAT'L L.J., Mar.
27, 1995, at BI (reporting one estimate that the company had spent more than $40 million
defending itself).
106. See In re Dow Coming Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 551-54 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997).
107. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 106, 114-24 (Nev. 1998)
(upholding a compensatory damage award of $4.2 million, but reversing punitive damage award
of $10 million).
108. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 996 F. Supp. 1110, 1113-17
(N.D. Ala. 1997); Artiglio v. Gen. Elec. Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 817, 822-23 (Ct. App. 1998); see
also White v. Weiner, 562 A.2d 378, 385-86 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (upholding summary
judgment for a company that had supplied bulk active ingredient to another company that
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these lawsuits, Dow discontinued supplying silicone for other important
medical device applications such as hydrocephalus shunts,"0 9 and other
biomaterials companies have refused to supply implant manufacturers with
essential components.''0
In response to fears of an emerging shortage of raw materials needed to
make life-saving medical devices, Congress enacted the Biomaterials Access
Assurance Act of 1998."' Under this statute, a biomaterials supplier that
neither manufactured nor sold the allegedly defective implant would face tort
liability only if it "failed to meet applicable contractual requirements or
specifications" when it furnished raw materials or component parts." 2 When
named in a lawsuit as a co-defendant, the biomaterials supplier receives certain
procedural benefits, including protection from sweeping discovery requests and
an opportunity to seek an expedited dismissal with prejudice or summary
judgment if the plaintiff cannot establish that the supplier also made or sold the
implant or furnished nonconforming biomaterials." 3 It remains to be seen
whether this legislation adequately reassures biomaterials suppliers, but the law
provides still another model for responding to concerns that unpredictable tort
litigation will cause additional shortages of critical pharmaceuticals in the
future.

manufactured a prescription drug implicated in a patient's death).
109. See RAND Sci. & Tech. Policy Inst., BiomaterialsAvailability: PotentialEffects on
Medical Innovation andHealth Care, Issue Paper No. 194, Jan. 2000, at 17, 32.
110. See H.R. REP. No. 105-549, at 10 (1998); Frederick D. Baker, Effects of Products
Liability on Bulk Suppliers of Biomaterials, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 455, 458 & n.21 (1995);
Robert F. Service, Liability Concerns ThreatenMedicalImplantResearch, 266 SCIENCE 726,726
(1994); Barnaby J. Feder, Implant Industry Is Facing Cutback by Top Suppliers, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 1994, at A I; John Stossel, Protect Us From Legal Vultures, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1996,
at 8 (noting that fears of liability caused the primary supplier of a special type of polyethylene
used in artificial joints to stop selling the material to implant manufacturers).
11. Pub. L. No. 105-230, 112 Stat. 1519 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1606 (2000)).
112. See 21 U.S.C. § 1604. The statute expressly preempts contrary state law. Id.
§ 1603(c).
113. See id. § 1605. The biomaterials supplier remains subject to impleader, but only if the
claimant or device manufacturer can persuade the trial judge that the negligence or intentionally
tortious conduct of the previously dismissed biomaterials supplier caused the harm and that the
manufacturer cannot or should not shoulder the full amount of any tortjudgment. See id. § 1606;
see also 66 Fed. Reg. 17,562 (Apr. 2, 2001) (announcing the availability of a draft guidance for
implementing a procedure to petition the FDA for a declaration concerning a biomaterials
supplier's compliance with establishment registration requirements); Ann Marie Murphy, Note,
The BiomaterialsAccess Assurance Act of 1998 and Supplier Liability: Who You Gonna Sue?,
25 DEL. J. Copp. L. 715, 738 (2000) (explaining that major suppliers remain unconvinced that
the statute will afford them meaningful protection).
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B. Stockpiling Reserves for a Rainy Day
The creation of emergency stockpiles represents another response to the
threat of shortages," 4 much like the strategic petroleum reserve established
after the OPEC oil embargo." 5 In 1982, the federal government began
stockpiling childhood vaccines. ' 16 On a couple of occasions, the CDC has
tapped into this reserve in order to cover temporary shortfalls caused by
production difficulties. 17 Although the agency continues to maintain the
stockpile at its original levels, the program has stagnated somewhat in the face

of resource constraints.' 18
More recently, the federal government created a National Pharmaceutical
Stockpile (NPS) of a range of drugs designed for rapid deployment in the event
of public health emergencies. "' When bioterrorism emerged as a threat to
civilians, some feared shortages of antibiotics effective in the treatment of

114. See Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 991 ("Another alternative for improving
supply reliability is stockpiling of vaccines to prepare for a possible substantial supply
interruption.").
115. See Kenneth Bredemeier, Will Oil Be Cut Off Again?, WASH. POST, May 16,2002, at
El ("[O]il-consuming nations today have amassed strategic petroleum reserves that now total
1.2 billion barrels of crude, led by 566 million barrels of oil in U.S. reserves stored in Louisiana
and Texas.").
116. See Mowery & Mitchell, supranote 9, at 991 ("[T]he U.S. government contracts with
vaccine manufacturers for a vaccine storage and rotation agreement to maintain a
twenty-four-week inventory of selected vaccines (tetanus-diphtheria, diphtheria-tetanus,
inactivated polio vaccine, OPV, DTP, and MMR)."); Peggy J. Naile, Note, Tort LiabilityforDPT
Vaccine Injury and the PreemptionDoctrine, 22 IND. L. REV. 655, 693 (1989) (explaining that,
after a shortage of DPT vaccine in 1984, the CDC undertook to stockpile a six month supply).
117. See Mowery & Mitchell, supranote 9, at 991 ("Since its inception, the stockpile has
been used seven times.").
118. See id. ("Congressional funding for the vaccine stockpile ended in 1991. Although
the existing twenty-four-week stockpile of the six vaccines previously listed has been
maintained, no new [types of] vaccines ... have been stockpiled, leaving them vulnerable to
supply interruptions."); id. ("The stockpile of MMR is maintained at a twelve-week level, and
that for DTP also is less than the six-month level, because the CDC does not wish to replenish
the stockpile with outmoded products."); see also id. at 999 ("The stockpiling program mandated
by Congress in 1982 provides relatively inexpensive insurance against supply interruptions but
requires more stable funding and expansion to cover new vaccines ... [and) more accurate
forecasts of vaccine demand and timely information on conditions of supply and stockpiles.").
119.
See
Nat'l
Ctr.
Envtl.
Health,
CDC,
NPS
Synopsis,
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/nceh/nps/synopses.htm (last visited May 21,2002); see also U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-463, COMBATING TERRORISM: ACCOUNTABILITY OVER MEDICAL
SUPPLIES NEEDS FURTHER IMPROVEMENT (2001); Reed Abelson & Robert Pear, ConcernsAbout
How Quickly the U.S. Can Deliver Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,2001, at B8 ("The government's
rapid response plan relies on eight so-called push packages, which are pre-assembled sets that
contain 84 or more different medical supplies, ranging from antibiotics to intravenous
supplies.... [E]ach 50-ton set is stored in an undisclosed location around the country .... );
cf. Scott Hensley & Ron Winslow, Drug Companies Contemplate New Role as "Biodefense
Contractors,"WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2001, at B1.
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anthrax.120 In addition, the relatively few remaining doses of the vaccine for
smallpox, a disease eradicated decades earlier, triggered research into the
possibility of diluting the available supplies in order to stretch the doses while
waiting for manufacturers to ramp up production under government contracts
to purchase 300 million doses.' The CDC has added both products to the
NPS, 22 and it also has purchased a large supply of potassium iodide, a drug
that provides some protection against thyroid damage from radioactive
123
fallout.

Stockpiles offer a stopgap measure for covering limited shortfalls in
supply, but they do not address the underlying causes of scarcity. 124 They also
present serious logistical difficulties that limit their usefulness, and resource
constraints make it unlikely that the federal government would ever manage to
establish-much less maintain-a truly comprehensive selection of critical
pharmaceuticals for a sizeable patient population. Instead, drug stockpiles will
play an increasingly important but still limited role as part of an emergency
response strategy.

120. See supra note 1; see also Ron Brookmeyer & Natalie Blades, Prevention of
Inhalational Anthrax in the US. Outbreak, 295 SCIENCE 1861 (2002) (concluding that
prophylactic use of antibiotics helped limit the number of cases).
121. See Rachel Zimmerman, Merck, GlaxoSmithKline Are Front-Runners to Produce
Smallpox Vaccinefor the U.S., WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2001, at A9. Researchers concluded that
diluted vaccine would confer immunity. See Sharon E. Frey et al., Clinical Responses to
Undiluted and Diluted Smallpox Vaccine, 346 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1265, 1267 (2002). The
government has not, however, begun to stockpile an antiviral drug approved for use in AIDS
patients even though it may help treat smallpox cases. See Marilyn Chase, MedicalDebateKeeps
U.S.from Stockpiling Smallpox Treatment, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2002, at A24.
122. See M.A.J. McKenna, Bioterrorism War Changes CDCRole, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Mar. 23, 2002, at IA ("Since last fall, enough antibiotics to treat 12 million potential cases of
anthrax for 60 days have been added to the stockpile. By the end of this year, enough smallpox
vaccine to protect the entire country also will be included."); see also Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, tit. I(B), 116 Stat.
594; Robert Pear, NegotiatorsReach Compromiseon Measure to Strengthen SafeguardsAgainst
Bioterror,N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2002, at A24 (explaining that Congress crafted this legislation
to defend against bioterrorism in part by "expand[ing] government stockpiles of antibiotics and
vaccines").
123. See Justin Gillis, US. Says It Bought Radiation Drug, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2002, at
A5.
124. See Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 991 ("In contrast to a preventive strategy
to develop more sources of supply for a specific vaccine by encouraging entry, stockpiling is a
remedial policy, designed to address supply interruptions once they occur.").
Stockpiling cannot resolve the consequences of a truly catastrophic supply
interruption, such as the complete destruction of a sole-source production facility,
because of the limited shelf life of vaccines and the lengthy time needed to license a
new production plant. Stockpiling is an important component of a broader strategy to
ensure the vaccine supply, one that includes steps to prevent supply interruptions and
to address the consequences of a long interruption of supply of a single-source
vaccine.
Id. at 992; see also id. at 993,998 (explaining the infeasibility of large emergency procurements
from foreign sources).
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C. Compulsory Licensing as an Antidote?
An even more radical strategy calls for active public sector involvement in

the production of critical pharmaceuticals. 21 Compulsory licensing, which
forces a patent holder to allow the use of an invention by others in exchange for
a fixed royalty, offers one mechanism for doing so, and some commentators
have suggested patent buyouts by the federal government as a mechanism for
controlling price and availability problems with critical drug products. 2 6 With
limited exceptions, however, the United States does not subject
pharmaceuticals to compulsory licensing.
In the case of orphan drugs, manufacturers receive an extended period of
market exclusivity, but it includes a provision for compulsory licensing in the
event of supply shortages. 27 In addition, pursuant to federal technology transfer
"' the government
laws, 28
enjoys a limited right to call for compulsory licensing
of inventions developed with its assistance: it retains so-called "march in"
rights that allow it to revoke a previously granted exclusive license if the
licensee fails to make a covered invention available to the public. 29 Finally,

125. See Brown, supra note 2, at Al ("Other possibilities [for averting future shortages]
include the creation of a 'National Vaccine Authority' that would help oversee vaccine
development, and the construction of a government-owned, contractor-operated production plant.
(These two ideas enjoy little support in the pharmaceutical industry.)"); Jon Cohen & Eliot
Marshall, Should the Government Make Vaccines?, TECH. REV., May 2002, at 39 (discussing
same).
126. See Robert C. Guell & Marvin Fischbaum, Toward Allocative Efficiency in the
Prescription Drug Industry, 73 MILBANK Q. 213, 221-25 (1995); Michael Kremer, Patent
Buyouts: A Mechanismfor EncouragingInnovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137, 1163-64 (1998); Evan
Ackiron, Note, Patentsfor CriticalPharmaceuticals:The AZT Case, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 145,
177-80 (1991).
127. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(b)(1) (2000).
128. Under the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, private entities may commercialize breakthroughs
supported by government funding. See Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3019 (1980) (codified
as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000)); see also Platzer v. Sloan-Kettering Inst., 787 F.
Supp. 360, 362 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 983 F.2d 1086 (Fed. Cir. 1992). See generallyRebecca
S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in
Government-SponsoredResearch, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996). Under the Federal Technology
Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, § 2, 100 Stat. 1785 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3710
(2000)), agencies could enter into cooperative research and developments agreements
(CRADAs), assigning to private entities the patents for any inventions developed in collaboration
with government researchers. Until 1995, the NIH imposed a "reasonable pricing" requirement
on products that emerged from a CRADA, which it dropped in the wake of criticism that this
amounted to the imposition ofprice controls. See Baruch Brody, Public Goods andFairPrices:
Balancing Technological Innovation with Social Well-Being, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr.
1996, at 5, 6.
129. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 201(0, 203 (2000); Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, WhyDon't
We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls? The Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable
Pricing Requirements Imposed upon Patents Deriving in Whole or in Partfrom Federally
FundedResearch, 75 TuL. L. REV. 631, 647, 659-66 (2001); Barbara M. McGarey & Annette

C. Levey, Patents,Products,and PublicHealth: An Analysis of the CellProMarch-In Petition,
14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095, 1099, 1115 (1999).
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although the United States does not have separate legislation authorizing
compulsory licensing of patents for pharmaceutical products, the Tucker Act
provides a right of action for the unlicensed use of a patent by the federal
government. 3 ' To the dismay of the pharmaceutical industry, the government
threatened to use this authority in order to acquire inexpensive supplies of the
antibiotic Cipro® (ciprofloxacin) for treating persons exposed to anthrax.' 3 '
Several industrialized countries used to have limited compulsory licensing

rules applicable to medical technologies either where necessary to combat a
threat to public health or after a period of non-use by the patent holder.'32 In
1993, Canada discontinued its practice of routine compulsory licensing as a
mechanism for controlling the prices of pharmaceuticals,' 33 though it remains

available as an option for public health emergencies. " For drugs patented after
May 15, 1997, the World Trade Organization (WTO) appears to prohibit
routine compulsory licensing, but, in case of a national emergency, a signatory
may authorize compulsory licensing of patented pharmaceuticals if necessary
to protect the public health.'

130. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000); Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1572, 157576, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In contrast, a few federal statutes provide for compulsory licensing
of patents under limited circumstances in other areas. See 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2000); 30 U.S.C.
§ 666 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2000). In rare instances, courts may
refuse to enjoin infringement by private parties where the patent holder withholds a license to
use the invention in a way that would promote the public health. See Vitamin Technologists, Inc.
v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941,945-47 (9th Cir. 1944) (holding invalid patents
for a process of using irradiation to fortify margarine with vitamin D to combat rickets, but
adding that, even if valid, it would not have enjoined the infringing use).
131. See Chea, supra note 46, at El. The government previously has used this power to
procure certain needed drugs such as the antibiotic tetracycline from sources other than the
patent holder or its licensees. See MILTON SILVERMAN & PHILIP R. LEE, PILLS, PROFITS, AND
POLITICS 186-87 (1974); see also Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 496 F.2d 535, 536 (Ct.
Cl. 1974) (tranquilizer meprobamate).
132. See Reed Boland, RU486 in Franceand England:CorporateEthics and Compulsory
Licensing, 20 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 226, 230 (1992).
133. See Patent Act Amendment, 1992, ch. 2, § 3 S.C. 11 (Can.); see also Sheldon
Burshtein, Sublicense or Supply Agreement? Supreme Court ofCanadaInterpretationBenefits
Generic Pharmaceutical Industry, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 73, 74-75 (1999); Mary
Atkinson,Comment, Patent Protectionfor Pharmaceuticals:A Comparative Study of the Law
in the United States and Canada, I PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 181, 191-92 (2002); Christopher
Scott Harrison, Comment, ProtectionofPharmaceuticalsas ForeignPolicy: The Canada-US.
Trade Agreement andBill C-22 Versus the North American Free TradeAgreement andBill C-91,
26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 457, 505-25 (2001).
134. See Shankar Vedantam & Terence Chea, Drug Firm PlaysDefense in Anthrax Scare:
For Now, US. Declines to Suspend Bayer's Patentand Authorize Generic Cipro, WASH. POST,
Oct. 20, 2001, at A4 (reporting that Canada had invoked its compulsory licensing authority for
this antibiotic).
135. See Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights Agreement, art. 3 1; see also
Sara M. Ford, Comment, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPs Agreement:
Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 941, 959-67 (2000); Susan Vastano
Vaughan, Note, Compulsory Licensing of PharmaceuticalsUnder TRIPS: What Standard of
Compensation?,25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 87, 96-100 (2001). The WTO eventually
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Of course, to the extent that many of the shortages involve products

lacking patent protection, the government would not need to exercise an
eminent domain power. Some commentators have suggested even more
aggressive government involvement in producing critical drugs, but past
experience with public control of vaccine manufacturing suggests caution.
Early in the nineteenth century, in response to concerns about the sale of fake
smallpox vaccine, Congress established an office responsible for providing
genuine supplies, but it repealed the law less than a decade later, after an
outbreak of smallpox linked to doses from this federal vaccine agent.136 A
century and a half later, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) faced criticism
for authorizing the release of sub-potent doses of polio vaccine, which some
commentators ascribed to a conflict of interest arising from the government's
commitment to widespread vaccination.137 The public health departments in a
couple of states produce their own supplies of certain childhood vaccines, 138but
doing this for numerous critical pharmaceuticals on a national scale seems both
impractical and inadvisable.
In 1992, the Institute of Medicine recommended the creation of a "surge"
production capacity for critical vaccines under public ownership,139 and it

may authorize compulsory licensing of patented drugs for the treatment of a broad range of
serious diseases. See Celia W. Dugger, A Catch-22 on Drugsfor the World's Poor,N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16,200 1, at W 1;Geoff Winestock & Helene Cooper, Activists OutmaneuverDrugMakers
at WTO, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2001, at A2.
136. See An Act to Encourage Vaccination, ch. 37, 2 Stat. 806 (1813) (repealed 1822);
H.R. REP. No. 17-93 (1822).
137. See Nicholas Wade, Division of Biologics Standards:The Boat That Never Rocked,
175 SCIENCE 1225, 1230 (1972) ("[F]ederal responsibility for vaccine development should be
clarified, in a way that ensures the DBS does not develop vaccines in-house."); Nicholas Wade,
Division of Biologics Standards: Scientific Management Questioned, 175 SCIENCE 966, 967
(1972) (reporting allegations that "management has suppressed or ignored scientific findings that
would adversely affect the vaccine market"); see also Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531,
542-48 (1988) (reviewing lawsuit brought against the NIH and FDA alleging negligence in
licensing and releasing lots of oral polio vaccine); In re Sabin Oral Polio Vaccine Prods. Liab.
Litig., 984 F.2d 124, 125-28 (4th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the government had unjustifiably
failed to implement the applicable requirements).
138. See Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 981-83 tbl.2, 995 (noting that Massachusetts
and Michigan make DTP vaccines); Stephen Smith, State Plans a $77MLabfor Vaccines, New
Drugs, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al.
139. See INST. OF MED., EMERGING INFECTIONS: MICROBIAL THREATS TO HEALTH INTHE
UNITED STATES 10-12, 150-58 (1992); see also INST. OF MED., THE CHILDREN'S VACCINE
INITIATIVE: ACHIEVING THE VISION (Violaine S. Mitchell et al. eds., 1993) (elaborating). The
1986 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act had included provisions designed to promote
vaccine innovation and production. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-I to -6 (2000); Alan R. Hinman, The
National Vaccine Programandthe National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program,44 FOOD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 633, 633-34 (1989); Phillip K. Russell, Development of Vaccines to Meet
Public Health Needs: Incentives and Obstacles, 7 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENVT. 239 (1996);
see also Rachel Nowak, U.S. National ProgramIs Going Nowhere Fast, 265 SCIENCE 1375
(1994).
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reiterated this proposal shortly after the latest terrorist attacks. 41 Some
commentators have, however, questioned the wisdom of undertaking such an
effort: "The costs of establishing a publicly operated standby facility in the
United States to provide a secure source of domestic supply are so high, and the
resulting facility so limited to specific vaccines, that any such step would be
unwise."' 14' As with bulk purchasing to create stockpiles, direct government
involvement in the production of vaccines and other critical pharmaceuticals
is unlikely to succeed on more than a very limited scale. Instead of trying to
displace private manufacturers, the federal government should try to help
ensure that market conditions are conducive to the production of ample
supplies by multiple sources.
IV. CONCLUSION

For a variety of reasons, shortages of vaccines and other critical pharmaceutical products have increased in the last few years. Pressures emanating
from regulatory agencies, courts, and insurers have conspired to make this line
of the pharmaceutical business less than attractive. The FDA's implementation
of GMP requirements, especially those governing the production of vaccines
and other biologics, have created compliance difficulties for manufacturers; the
threat of tort liability continues to drive some drug companies from particular
markets; and cost-containment pressures resulting from bulk government
purchases or declining levels of insurance reimbursement have eroded profit
margins. Under these conditions, the pharmaceutical industry's focus on
blockbuster drugs for lifestyle uses or chronic health conditions should come
as no great surprise.
This is a multi-faceted problem that does not admit of any single or simple
solution, but the government should not respond in ways that further weaken
market incentives. Instead, it should try to encourage private manufacturers to
continue supplying critical pharmaceutical products. A number of steps would
help improve the business climate: more flexible regulation of manufacturing

140. See Council of the Inst. of Med., Statement on Vaccine Development, Nov. 5, 2001,

http://www.iom.edu/iom/iomhome.nsf/pages/vaccine+development (last visited Oct. 3, 2002);
Bioterrorism Risks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat ' Sec., Veterans' Affairs and
InternationalRelations ofthe House Comm. on Gov 't Reform, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony

of Kenneth I. Shine, President, Institute of Medicine).
141. Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 995, 998; see also id. ("Cost and feasibility are
the key disadvantages ofany publicly financed, publicly owned vaccine production facility that
could be pressed into service in the event of a catastrophic supply interruption."); id. ("[IOM]
estimated the capital costs alone of a vaccine development and pilot production facility to be $30
million to $75 million. The capital costs of a full-scale production facility would undoubtedly
be higher ....

Moreover, the costs of a multiproduct facility would be higher still."); id.

("[G]aining and retaining an FDA establishment license for vaccine production requires the
continuous production of test lots. Thus a licensed standby facility is feasible only if it is nothing
ofthe kind. Any standby facility would have to be engaged in the regular production of vaccines
....

.).
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facilities, greater protection from the vagaries of tort liability, and the
avoidance of excessive cost controls. In addition, the government should
bolster its emergency stockpiles, but it must take care to avoid suggestions that
the public sector should take over the entire operation, because then we really
would have only a single supplier that would risk many of the same shortcomings that government-run monopolies have encountered in other fields.
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